Repository logo
  • English
  • Català
  • Čeština
  • Deutsch
  • Español
  • Français
  • Gàidhlig
  • Italiano
  • Latviešu
  • Magyar
  • Nederlands
  • Polski
  • Português
  • Português do Brasil
  • Srpski (lat)
  • Suomi
  • Svenska
  • Türkçe
  • Tiếng Việt
  • Қазақ
  • বাংলা
  • हिंदी
  • Ελληνικά
  • Српски
  • Yкраї́нська
  • Log In
    New user? Click here to register.Have you forgotten your password?
Repository logo
  • Communities & Collections
  • Research Outputs
  • Fundings & Projects
  • People
  • Statistics
  • English
  • Català
  • Čeština
  • Deutsch
  • Español
  • Français
  • Gàidhlig
  • Italiano
  • Latviešu
  • Magyar
  • Nederlands
  • Polski
  • Português
  • Português do Brasil
  • Srpski (lat)
  • Suomi
  • Svenska
  • Türkçe
  • Tiếng Việt
  • Қазақ
  • বাংলা
  • हिंदी
  • Ελληνικά
  • Српски
  • Yкраї́нська
  • Log In
    New user? Click here to register.Have you forgotten your password?
  1. Home
  2. Academic Research Output
  3. Journal Article
  4. Divine foreknowledge and human free will: Embracing the paradox
 
  • Details
Options

Divine foreknowledge and human free will: Embracing the paradox

Date Issued
2021
Author(s)
DeVito, Michael
McNabb, Tyler Dalton 
Faculty of Religious Studies and Philosophy 
DOI
10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1
Abstract
A family of objections to theism aims to show that certain key theological doctrines, when held in conjunction, are incompatible. The longstanding problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom represents one such objection. In this essay, we provide the theist an epistemic approach to the problem that allows for the rational affirmation of both divine foreknowledge and human freedom (understood as the ability to do otherwise) despite their prima facie incompatibility. Specifically, we apply James Anderson’s Rational Affirmation of Paradox Theology model to the problem, arguing that the theist can stave off defeat that arises from a belief in the conjunction of both doctrines by appealing to paradox. In order to establish this thesis, we first define key terms as well as lay out the theological fatalist argument. Next, we explicate Anderson’s model and apply it to the foreknowledge and freedom problem. We conclude by addressing the objection that an appeal to paradox is simply special pleading for the theist, arguing that the naturalist can be found in a similar epistemic position.
File(s)
No Thumbnail Available
Name

Waiting for Repository Version.pdf

Size

37.66 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum

(MD5):70439f9ac5a8bde2f366653765cefe3c


  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook


USJ Library

Estrada Marginal da Ilha Verde
14-17, Macau, China

E-mail:library@usj.edu.mo
Tel:+853 8592 5633

Quick Link

Direction & Parking
USJ website
Contact Us

Built with DSpace-CRIS software - Extension maintained and optimized by 4Science

  • Cookie settings
  • Privacy policy
  • End User Agreement
  • Send Feedback